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MEASURING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES:
INCOME, HEALTH AND WELFARE
Roderick K . Floud(+)
Abstract : The measurement of national income has added
greatly to our understanding of economic and social change
in Europe over the past hundred years . But national income
analysis does not take full account of changes in welfare
and particularly of the causes and effects of long-term
changes in the health of the European populations . The
paper surveys methods which have been used to adjust
national income estimates and shows that they can be
supplemented, if not replaced, by measures of growth in
human physical height as an indicator of changes in the
nutritional status of national populations, of the peoples
of particular areas and of social classes.
National income analysis is central to our present knowledge of the trans-
formation of the European economies . By their painstaking work, a generation
of scholars such as Bairoch, Feinstein and Hoffmann have delineated that
transformation as it appears in the national accounts which they have com-
piled ; they have enormously facilitated comparisons between the national
economies as well as the description and analysis of changes within those
economies (Bairoch 1976 ; Feinstein 1972 ; Hoffmann 1965 and survey in Crafts
1983) . As a result of their work, economic historians in western Europe turn
naturally to such concepts as gross domestic product per capita, factor
shares of labour or capital and growth rates of gross national product and
use them as basic building blocks in their endeavour to describe and analyse
the European economies and the relations between them.
It is in the nature of scholarship, however, that the work of one generation
should be questioned by the next . Just as the great compilations of his-
torical national income statistics are completed and used in such works as
British Economic Growth 1856-1973, by Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee
(1982), so questions are raised about the suitability of the national income
framework for the analysis of economic development in the long-run . Doubts
are expressed about the assumptions concerning the structure and workings of
economies which underlie this mode of analysis, about the irrelevance of
national frontiers to many of the processes of economic growth and, most
fundamentally, about the significance of national income itself, either as a
measure of production or as a measure of welfare.
Many of these doubts arise from uncertainty about a fundamental question -
what is the purpose of measuring national income, at one moment in time, or
growth in national income over time? Are we concerned with the productive
power, technology or organisation of the economy or with the outcome of its
work? The answer must surely be that we measure economic growth to discover
something about the welfare of people within the community . As Dan Usher
puts it in his stimulating book The Measurement of Economic Growth:
(+) Address all communications to : R .C . Floud, University of London,
Birkbeck Kollege, Department of History, Malet Street,
GB-London, WCIE 7HX, England
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"The major premise of the book is that statistics of economic growth may
be interpreted and proposals for improvement may be judged appropriate
or otherwise by means of an analogy between a country and a person:
economic growth to a country is like a raise in salary to an individual
. . . For without such a translation, measures of real income and economic
growth are mere numbers with no apparent effect upon our lives and no
status as indicators of progress towards goals that people might want
the economy to achieve . Without the possibility of such a translation,
the measurement of economic growth is nonsens . Why, after all, would we
want to measure economic growth, why is public policy directed to the
promotion of economic growth, why do economic historians and specialists
in economic development search for the explanation of economic growth,
if we are not better off after economic growth than we were before?"
(1980 : I-2)
Unfortunately, the traditional measures of welfare which are based upon
national income often appear to have serious deficiencies as measures of how
much 'better off' we are, either than people in the past or than people in
other societies at the same point in time . As Usher and others have pointed
out, economic change has had many more dimensions and consequences than
those which appear to be measured by the traditional computations of real
income per capita . For example, modern European societies are certainly much
richer than they were a century ago, in terms of income per capita, but in
addition the average citizen of those countries also enjoys that higher
income for much longer, because of the major changes which have occurred in
expectation of life. Most of us would probably regard this reduction in
mortality as a major improvement in welfare, but it is one that is largely
ignored by conventional measures . Similarly, those longer lives are, in most
cases, lived within environments that are notably less polluted than the
towns and cities of nineteenth century Europe but, once again, this environ-
mental improvement is hardly reflected in measures of real income.
Another difficulty with conventional measures lies in their failure to take
account of the amount of work effort that is required to produce a given
level of income. Not only have hours of work within the working day, and
weeks of work within the working year, fallen drastically within the past
century - a change which is easy to document - but in very many occupations
work is now easier, pleasanter and less dangeours than in the last century,
while many of the most arduous and hazardous of occupations have entirely
disappeared . Higher incomes are thus more easily earned, which again would
seem to most of us to make us 'better off'.
Yet a further problem is that conventional measures of welfare based on
national income are derived by dividing estimated national product by the
estimated population, to give, for example, gross domestic product per
capita . When the benefits of economic growth are being assessed over periods
in which there were major changes in the age structure of the population or
in the degree of inequality of the income and wealth distributions, this
procedure may give misleading results . It is straightforward to suggest
that, in such cases, an adjustment should be made to take account of the
different consumption levels and requirements of children, working adults
and retired people . It is much less straightforward, as Atkinson has shown,
to take account of changing inequality in measuring national income per head
since to do so implies judgements about the desirability of different de-
grees of inequality
. ( 1 975 : 47-9)
These difficulties, which make conventional measures of income seem to be
inadequate measures of welfare, have of course long been known to econo-
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mists . To some, the advantages which stem from the use of standardised me-
thods of measurement and from the link which they have with measures of
money income have stifled doubts ; they are essentially content to define
welfare within the-confines of national income analysis
. Other economists
have, however, made attempts to adjust conventional measures to make them
more representative of lay ideas of welfare . In particular, Usher has pro-
posed a method by which changes in real income might be adjustd for changes
in mortality
. Applied to Canadian data for the period from 1926 to 1974, his
'imputation for life expectancy' raised the rate of economic growth by
about one-half of one per cent per year from 2
.83 % without the imputation
to about 3
.35 %, give or take 0 .03 %" (Usher 1980 : 245) . As he comments,
this is by no means negligible ; it increases the measured rate by about 20 $.
Perhaps more
	
significant, when one is considering the implications for
historical study, is that Usher's attempts to make similar estimates for
under-developed countries had even more dramatic effects on measured growth.
Sri Lanka, for example, experienced a growth rate between 1946 and 1968 of
1
.43 % per year by conventional measures, but of between 3 .23 and 3 .70 %
after an imputation for changes in life expectancy
. Even for a relatively
rich country like Japan, the imputation raises growth between 1930 and 1974
from 3
.
99 % per year to between 5 .23 and 5
. 45 % . As one would expect, in
fact, the greater the rise in life expectancy, the larger the effect of
adjusting for it.
Very recently, Jeffrey Williamson has applied Usher's method to the des-
cription of economic growth in nineteenth century Britain . (1984) Although
Williamson has reservations about Usher's arguments, he concludes that life
expectancy gains have played a very important role in British growth perfor-
mance and that " . . . conventional indices of real income growth may under-
state true living standard growth by 25 % or more", with the greatest
effects being. seen in the second half of the nineteenth century and the
first third of the twentieth . Thus British growth is seen, on these grounds,
to have accelerated much more sharply since the middle of the nineteenth
century than is suggested by more conventional measures.
While mortality decline has been one of the most spectacular changes which
have affected welfare in the past two centuries, other environmental changes
deserve attention . It has long been argued that one of the worst effects of
industrialization was the pollution from smoke, other chemicals and human
ordure which characterised nineteenth century cities . While mortality trends
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are still a subject of
dispute, their general improvement is beyond question . Pollution, on the other
hand, probably got very much worse during the nineteenth century before
substantially improving in the twentieth
. In another piece of work,
Williamson has attempted to estimate the compensation which English la-
bourers required to induce them to move from countryside to town during the
industrial revolution (1982)
. He found, for example, that between 7 % and
13 % of the difference in wages between urban and rural workers could be
attributed to the need for such compensatory or persuasive wage increases.
While his estimates are not cast in the form of adjustments to national
income and they would need substantial modification on the basis of addi-
tional research if they were to be extended to all classes of worker and to
other sections of the population, in principle such adjustments should be
made . Pollution did reduce the welfare of those who lived under a pall of
smoke and larger parts of European populations did so during the nineteenth
century.
Pollution damages health
. It seems clear, for example, that smoke pollution
was a contributory cause of the rickets which disfigured large numbers of
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the working class of Britain whose diet was already deficient in vitamin D
(Loomis 1970) . It might be argued, of course, that any adjustment for pollu-
tion, based upon compensating wage payments, would include such health
effects, although it is stretching market economics rather a long way to
suggest that wage labourers in nineteenth century England required extra pay
to compensate themselves for rachitic children . Other changes in health are,
however, certainly not to be subsumed within adjustments for pollution or
even for changing life expectancy.
Williamson (1984) begins his discussion with the words : "Like all concepts
of economic value, the value of longevity gains has two multiplicative
parts : price and quantity ." He and Usher concentrate, therefore, on mea-
suring quantity, in the form of numbers of people living extra years, and
price, in the form of an assessment of the price those people are prepared
to pay for an improvement in their chances of survival . These computations,
however, appear to ignore the fact that, typically, individuals do not enjoy
perfect health from the time they are born until the moment that they drop
down dead . As Oddy (1982 :121) has recently pointed out, we know very little
about the health of people in the past, as opposed to knowing a great deal
about why they died ; common-sense and contemporary observation both suggest,
however, that societies, and sub-groups of societies, with higher levels of
life expectation also have less ill-health than do societies with lower
levels of life expectation . In other words, not only have people in Europe
come to live longer, but they are also probably healthier at each age than
they were two hundred years ago . This is a notable addition to welfare (and
probably also a notable addition to the productive capacity of the economy)
but one that has been almost entirely ignored by economists and economic
historians.
The same mistake, it should be said, has sometimes been made even by his-
torians of health . In The People's Health, 1830-1920, for example, F .B.
Smith suggests that increasing life expectancy in the late nineteenth centu-
ry increased the number of ill and old people in the community, implicitly
assuming that health did not improve commensurately with declining mortality
(1929 :320) . A similar error is often made by those who speak today of the
'burden of the aged' on contemporary European populations.
The adjustments made by Usher and Williamson on the basis of mortality rates
therefore certainly understate, probably by a large amount, the benefits to
human welfare which have accrued during the past two centuries . But health
improvements do not exhaust the factors which need to be taken into account
in assessing changes in welfare . Paradoxically, as European populations have
become healthier and stronger, more capable of undertaking sustained phy-
sical work, so increases in the use of machinery and other forms of capital
have reduced and in some cases removed the need for such work . In addition,
it is reasonable to attribute to such technological changes the fact that we
now need to work far shorter hours to secure a given level of income . To
most people, as they watch television or fly to Mediterranean holidays, the
increase in leisure time is unambiguously an addition to welfare ; the abili-
ty to dig holes from the seat of a bulldozer rather than by wielding a spade
may be less obviously of benefit, but the reduced danger of manual occupa-
tions certainly is . Usher reports and comments upon imputations for leisure
made by Sametz (1968) ; he also calculates an imputation for increased lei-
sure in Canada from 1926 to 1971, whose effect is "to increase the rate of
growth of real consumtpion per head over the whole forty-eight year period
by almost a full per cent per year from 2 .49 % to 3 .37 %" (1980 :146-147) . He
does not, however, consider the effects of increased ease of work .
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As this discussion has shown, it is very easy to suggest ways in which
measured trends in national income should be adjusted for improvements in
welfare and to demonstrate that such adjustments would be substantial . There
are, however, formidable obstacles in making the adjustments . There are two
principal difficulties ; first, it is important to consider how far the
improvements are truly exogenous to, and therefore not already to some
degree reflected in, increase in real income as it is conventionally mea-
sured. Second, there is a substantial problem of double counting ; how can we
separate, for example, the effects of increased life expectancy from the
effects of improved health.
Usher and Williamson differ substantially when they discuss whether improve-
ments in life expectancy are truly exogenous . This point is extremely impor-
tant ; if all the improvements in health and life expectation were bought by
people devoting part of their current consumption expenditure specifically
to buy improved health and longer life, then there would be no reason to
adjust measured national income for improvements in health and mortality . As
Williamson rightly argues, Usher assumes that all mortality changes . . . are
exogenous to the household, totally independent of household investments in
health via the mix in and the level of C (current consumption) itself ."
(1984 :160) . Williamson is wrong, however, in asserting that " . . . nowhere
does Usher admit the possibility that current measured consumption influen-
ces mortality experience" (.1984 :162), since Usher considers exactly that
point on pp. 247-252, where he concludes that:
. I feel that the environmental component of observed mortality rates
is a large enough portion of the total that the bias in treating morta-
lity rates as though they were largely environmental need not have a
significant impact on our results ." (1980 :251).
Williamson argues, by contrast, that Usher does not take sufficient account
of "endogenous household response to changes in 'health technology', like
lower fuel prices offering better food preparation or warmer residences", or
of "endogenous changes in morality attributable to workers' investment in
health, made possible by increase in income ." (1984 :162) . For this reason,
Williamson does not consider that the whole of the increase in life expect-
ancy should be used in adjusting national income, although he considers that
over time an increasing proportion has been exogenously determined.
Similar objections can be raised to all the other adjustments which have
been proposed . To the extent that increased leisure has been bought by
investment in capital equipment, that improvement is already subsumed within
increasing income . Similarly, as Williamson suggests, current consumption of
fuel may warm houses and thus improve health . The relative degree of endo-
geneity and exogeneity in such improvements is very subjective ; while
Williamson quotes McKeown and Record to the effect that " . . . change in the
character of these infections diseases, essentially independent of human
intervention, may have been responsible for not less than one-fifth and - as
a very rough estimate - for not more than one third" (of the nineteenth
century mortality decline) it seems very unlikely that McKeown and Record
would go to the stake for such precise estimates (1984 :164, quoting 1962:
119).
A second cause of difficulty lies in the extent of double counting that may
be involved when imputations are made for more than one improvement in
welfare . More leisure and less hard work may lead, for example, to better
health and a longer life ; imputing separately for leisure, health and morta-
lity changes will, therefore, considerably overstate the size of the impro-
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vement in welfare . It is not unreasonable to conclude, in fact, that imputa-
tions to national income may be more trouble than they are worth.
Conventional measures of welfare do not, however, emerge very well from
discussions such as this . There are, in addition, other objections to their
use which are, broadly, that societies are so lacking in homogeneity that
conventional measures of mean income per capita are misleading if not use-
less. It is an obvious feature of the transformation of the European econo-
mies that there have been very marked changes in the extent of income
inequality, measured on a national basis . In addition, many European coun-
tries have exhibited marked geographical inequalities, so marked that some
historians have doubted whether national economic histories have much
meaning . It has become increasingly common, in addition, for economic his-
torians to emphasise the importance or regional development, sometimes
spreading across one or more national frontiers . As Pollard writes in Peace-
ful Conquest his study diverges from work in the Gerschenkron tradition and
from the
"almost axiomatic assumption of Gerschenkron, Kuznets and others that
countries within their political boundaries are the only units within
which it is worthwhile to consider the process of industrialisation.
It is a major premiss of this study that this process, on the contrary,
is essentially one of regions, operating in a European context and that
in the early phases, when the foundations were being laid for the
industrial transformation of society, governments were at best irrelevant,
and frequently took a negative part, in a development which drew its
main driving force from outside the political and governmental sphere . "
(1981 :vii).
If this is so, conventional measures of mean national income within national
boundaries are of little value to the economic historian . What is required
instead is measures of real income, or analogous measures of welfare, for
the population of defined regions or for other occupational or geographical
sub-groups within the European population, sometimes within and sometimes
straddling national boundaries . Conventional national income calculations,
which rely heavily on governmental sources for their statistics and which
must take account of trade flows as a major item within the national ac-
counts, are ill suited for such purposes.
A traditional answer to such difficulties, indeed one which pre-dates na-
tional income analysis, is the computation of measures of the standard of
living or welfare of sections of the population in the form of measures of
real incomes or real wages . Unfortunately, as generations of economic his-
torians have discovered, such computations are also fraught with difficulty,
principally because of the enormous problem of obtaining matching and satis-
factorily weighted series of price and wage observations which can be merged
to give real wage indices . Despite the intensive study to which historians
have subjected the price and wage series for the British industrial revolu-
tion, there is still no agreement on what they show, and the British econo-
mic history profession is about to embark on yet another attempt to collect
more satisfactory statistics (Flinn 1974 ; , Von Tunzelmann 1979 ; Lindert and
Williamson 1983). Even for Britain in the late nineteenth century, where the
wage and price series compiled by Bowley and Wood have long been used
without much disagreement, Gazeley has recently shown how simple improve-
ments to their work can significantly alters the course of real wages during
the period (1983). For both periods, it has proved to be remarkably diffi-
cult to obtain appropriate price series which reflect what the consumer
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actually paid, rather than bulk import prices or wholesale prices within the
home market . Another major problem has been that of taking account of the
fact that incomes are typically earned and consumed within the framework of
the family . Not only is it extremely difficult to link together the incomes
of different family members to compute total family income, it is also
virtually impossible to know how consumption was distributed within the
household ; moreover, as the work of Laslett and others has shown, there are
many conceptual problems in defining a typical or average family unit for
such purposes . (1972).
To sum up this catalogue of problems, neither computations of the real wage
nor those of national income per head seem easily to meet Usher's criterion
that they should be more than "mere numbers with no apparent effect upon our
lives and no status as indicators of progress towards goals that people
might want the economy to achieve ." (1980 :2) . They give us only a most
inadequate idea of the impact which the transformation of European society
has had upon the lives of Europeans.
This is a dispiriting conclusion . But there has recently emerged an alterna-
tive source of information about the welfare of Europeans in the past which
will at least supplement, and for some purposes replace, the traditional
measures of welfare. This information lies in the millions of observations
held in European archives of the physical height of people in the past . It
has long been known - both from academic study and from common observation
that people have been growing taller, but it has only recently become clear
that that fact carries with it much information about their welfare.
Figure 1 summarises a small part of what is currently known about the
changes which have occurred in the average height of young adult males in
western Europe during the past two hundred years . The data, which have been
described in more detail in another paper (Floud 1984), owe much to the work
of Marie-Klaude Chamla (1964) but they have been supplemented here by other
sources and by statistical analysis . As Figure 1 shows, the changes in mean
height within Europe have been substantial, as indeed they have been in the
United States, Japan and many other countries (Fogel et al . 1983 ; Greulich
1976 ; Eveleth and Tanner 1976 ; Tanner 1981) . But are such changes merely an
historical curiosity or do they contain information of value to economic
historians?
Judgments on the value of data on historical height must rest on two founda-
tions . The first is the work of contemporary human biologists, anthropolo-
gists and social scientists who have demonstrated the significance of height
and its relationship to other socio-economic indicators within the modern
world . The second is the relationship of height measurements to other socio-
economic indicators in the past . The conclusion from the first group of
studies can be briefly stated, although to do so is to summarise an enormous
range of literature ; Eveleth and Tanner's book, for example, contains many
hundreds of series of height measurements from the modern world . Briefly,
however, these studies show that height - and indeed other measures of
physical growth - are extremely sensitive indicators of what is best called
the 'net nutritional status' of the child, adolescent or adult, considered
as individuals and also as members of an homogeneous socio-economic group.
Figure 2 shows the pattern of growth in the average height of groups of
children (measured cross-sectionally at each year of age) which is charac-
teristic of all human populations - although the height that is achieved and
the speed with which it is achieved differ between one population and
another and between sub-groups of each population . Humans require energy, in
childhood and adolescence, for three purposes : body maintenance, growth and
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physical effort in work or play . Insufficient energy intake in the form of
food and warmth, or the unusual expenditure of energy in combatting disease,
will affect the ability of the body to grow, to work and finally to live,
the effects being seen in that order ; famine and chronic disease will first
affect growth, then diminish the ability to move and work and finally cause
death.
It must not be thought, however, that growth is affected only in conditions
of famine or chronic disease still characteristic of too much of our world.
Even within rich, developed nations there is a clear class gradient in
growth, in which the upper classes grow more rapidly and attain greater
height than do the lower social classes . Moreover, even within particular
income groups, both physical and psychological health affects growth, so
that children grow less rapidly, for example, during periods of institu-
tional care than when they are cared for within the family.
The net nutritional status - the interplay between energy inputs, health and
bodily activity - can clearly affect a human being only during the period of
growth in childhood and adolescence . Once growth ceases in early adulthood,
the body is set in the height which it has acquired, at least until shrink-
ing occurs in late middle and old age . Yet the factors that have affected
growth are so pervasive that their effects can still be seen in adulthood;
height is, for example, a good predictor of morbidity and mortality from
heart disease, even after controlling for social class and income . In ex-
treme environments, mortality has been shown to be highly predicted by
height (Friedman 1982).
For all these reasons, physical growth in height is of great interest to
contemporary social scientists and medical researchers . But, because height
represents the net effect of income in the form of the intake of food and
warmth, combined with the effects of environment in the form of disease, and
societal and technologically determined requirements for work effort, it
should also be of great interest to economists and economic historians
concerned with measuring welfare . Figure 1, therefore, represents the in-
carnation of changes in welfare within the bodies of the European popula-
tions.
This is easy to assert, but it is sensible to enquire into the relationship
which exists between height and more traditional measures of welfare such as
those which I have criticised earlier in this paper . Three illustrations
must suffice.
First, Steckel has shown that, in the modern world, mean height is highly
correlated with national income and with measures of inequality in the
distribution of that income ; table s shows his results .. (1983).
Second, I have demonstrated an equally close relationship betwen height,
(based on a subset of the data shown in figure 1), and measures of gross
domestic product per capita (in real terms) and infant mortality in western
Europe during the past hundred years . These results are shown in table 2 . It
was not possible, because of lack of data, to incorporate either measures of
income inequality or other environmental variables into this historical
analysis, but it seems likely that the dummy variables representing country
of measurement incorporate such effects (1984) . A particularly interesting
feature of these results, when they are compared to those of Steckel, is
that the relationship between national income per capita and height appears
to vary very little over time, when other variables employed by Steckel and
myself are held constant . The comparison is shwon in table 3 .
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Third, in recent studies which are so far unpublished I have shown that a
clear relationship exists in historical data between height and socio-
economic status ; table 4, for example, is a comparison between the mean
height of a group of children from the London slums in the early nineteenth
century with a group of children, the sons of aristocrats, gentry and the
higher ranks of the army and navy, who joined the Royal Military Academy at
Sandhurst . Table 4 shows that, for example at the age of 14, the children of
the upper classes were about 8 inches (20 .3 cm) taller than those from the
London slums . Since we know that the distribution of heights at a given age
is normal, with a standard deviation of about 2 .5 inches (6 .4 cm) this
allows us to say that 94
.
5 $ of children of the upper classes were taller
than all except 5 .5 % of children of the slums . This substantial class
variation in heights had diminished in Britain by the end of the nineteenth
century but was still clearly visible when measured heights were classified
by social class, as indeed it is today.
While these examples substantiate the assertion that economists and economic
historians should pay attention to height measurements, it is perhaps not
obvious that height data are superior to other data as measures of welfare.
Why, a sceptic might ask, should we bother to collect large quantities of
height data when the result is merely to show that average height is highly
correlated with measurements which have already been made? The advantage of
height over other measures of welfare is, however, that height measures
already include the effects of environmental or exogenous influences on
welfare which are not included within conventional measures of income . Thus
there is no need to inpute for such influences in the manner of Usher or
Williamson.
This statement, which may appear to be making a large claim, is in fact
implicit in the regression analyses shown in tables 1 and 2 and in the
analysis of class differences . For in table s height is shown to vary in
close relation to the joint variation in gross domestic product per capita,
in inequality of income and in a number of other environmental variables . In
table 2, similarly, height reflects joint movements in income and infant
mortality (used as a proxy for health), while the country dummies in the
equation pick up other environmental factors . While these sources of varia-
tion operate at a national level, table 4 shows that height is equally
useful as a discriminator between social and economic conditions within a
particular society . In other words, height data are a direct measure of
welfare, much closer to what we think of as welfare or the standard of
living than artificial constructs such as national income per capita or the
real wage.
It is very easy, in addition, to apply height data as a measure of welfare
to sub-groups of national populations, either on a regional or on an occupa-
tional basis, since most sources of height data also contain details of
place of birth or residence and of occupation . The data used by Aron, Dumont
and le Roy Ladurie, for example, in their description of the Anthropologie
du conscrit francais contains much more information than they realised about
variation in standards of living between departments in France, information
which is also available in many other records of conscription throughout
Europe . They calculate, for example, that the conscripts from the depart-
ments of Allier and Landes in 1819-182o were on average 164 .1 cm (64 .6 in .)
tall, while those from Nord were 168 .7 cm (66 .4 in .), heights which corres-
pond, as table 3 suggests, to very different levels of mean income.
Last, height measures require no adjustment for inflation, while both
measures based on national income and measures of real wage are extremely
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sensitive to particular choices of deflator and to particular choices of
exchange rates for international comparisons . It is true, of course, that
the exact functional form which relates height to its various determinants
has still be to be fully specified, but the number and range of observations
of height is so great that the chances of progress in this direction are
very good.
There are, however, several difficulties in using height as a measure of
welfare . Usher argued, it will be recalled, that statistics of economic
growth may be judged or interpreted by means of an analogy between a
country and a person : economic growth to a country is like a raise in salary
to an individual" (1980 :2) . Height data cannot be similarly translated for
two main reasons . First, a country may pursue policies which will tend to
raise the average height of its citizens - by increasing their income and
health or by decreasing inequality - but such a policy is not feasible for
an individual in relation to himself or herself, although it may be feasible
in relation to his or her children . Second, while it is clear from the
literature of growth that almost all variation in heights between popula-
tions is environmentally determined, the same is definitely not true of
individuals, where genetic or inherited factors account for a large part of
an individual's height ; assessment of an individual's welfare from his or
her height is thus impossible without knowledge of the heights of parents
and siblings . In other words, it is very difficult to see height as an
argument in an individual utility function and, to that extent, height is
inferior to such measures as the real wage, if it were ever possible to
calculate that measure in the ideal manner.
Height measures also possess the deficiency that, just because height re-
flects so many influences upon growing children, it may be extremely diffi-
cult to identify just which change in income or environment has produced a
given change in height . In addition, a particular measurement of mean height
of a group of children at a particular age reflects all the influences upon
children from their birth up to that age ; their mean height is in a sense a
summary of their welfare up to the time they are measured, rather than of
their welfare at that moment in time.
It is impossible to claim, therefore, that the measurement of the heights of
European populations in the past can entirely settle the issue of how far
their standard of living has altered, particularly since it has so far
proved to be difficult to find many measurments in the past for women, more
than half of the human race. Yet it is reasonable to claim that height
measures do possess very substantial advantages over measures of welfare
which have traditionally been estimated and that they do throw much new
light on the welfare outcome of the transformation of the European economy.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------Intercept 116 .0 33.38 160.5 13.99
Log per capita income 3 .545 7 .644 3.490 2.223
Gini -8 .260 1 .283
-36.74 4.408
Urban
-0 .3085 0.359 -0.148 0.0909
Rural
-3 .392 3.359 -2.524 1 .315
Poor
-7.968 4 .938
Rich 5 .483 6 .426
Student 1 .225 1 .148
Military 2.599 1 .765
Female 0.1171 0 .263 -11 .24 16 .05
European ancestor -4 .452 3 .313 -1 .170 0 .5954





-6.315 4 .582 -1 .673 0 .6294
Indo-Mediterranean -4.531 2 .166 2 .321 0 .7658
Age 11 5.250 7 .961
Age 12 11 .11 16 .85
Age 13 16.81 24 .80









TABLE 2. THE DETERMINANTS OF EUROPEAN HEIGHTS, 1880-1971.













































CD1 (Belgium), CD3 (France), CD7 (Switzerland), TD1 (1920-1945) and
TD2 (1946-1971) were not significant at the 5% level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
N= 64
Adjusted R squared = 0 .964
Method : OLS, pooled cross-section and time-series data.
Omitted variables : Italy and time period 1880-1919.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- 40 -
TABLE 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEIGHT AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY DATA . ADULT MALES.
Hypothetical income
	








150 160:9 Out of range Out of range
250 162.7 Out of range Out of range
500 165.1 165 .0 163.8
1000 167 .5 166.4 166.9
2000 169.9 169 .0 169.9
3000 171 .4 171
.6 171 .7
4000 172.4 174 .2 173.0
5000 173 .1 Out of range Out of range
----------------------------------------------------------------------Explanation of columns:
Column 1 : Hypothetical income is in 1970 U .S . dollars.
Column 2 : From Steckel (1983:6) table 3 . The prediction is based on a
national study for a population with European ancestors ; the Gini
coefficient is evaluated at the sample mean
. The underlying regression
equation utilised the log (base e) of per capita income.
Column 3 : Calculated from table 2, assuming a national study for a
European population (Italy) ; INFM is evaluated at the sample mean.
Column 4 : Calculated from a regression model similar to that in table
2, but using the log (base e) of GDP per capita as the predictor.
Adjusted R square was 0 .96. The model assumed a national study for a
European population (Italy) ; INFM was evaluated at the sample mean.
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1804-8 52 .1 1806-15 61 .4 1804-8 54 .9 1806-15 63.5
1814-17 53.8 1816-25 61 .8 1814-17 54 .4 1816-25 64.3
1826-28 56.0 1826-35 61 .5 1826-28 57 .1 1826-35 64 .2
1836-37 56.5 1836-45 62.0 1826-28 57.3 1836-45 63.6
1845-47 56.2 1846-57 62.1 1845-47 57.3 1846-57 64.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. Dates are those of recruitment, at the age given.
2. The heights of Marine Society recruits have been adjusted for
truncation, following the method described in Wachter and Trussell
(1982).
3. A full description of the Marine Society data can be found in Floud
and Wachter (1982).
